In his April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama outlined his arms control and nuclear nonproliferation objectives. At the top of the list was his assessment that terrorists are “determined to buy, build, or steal” a nuclear weapon, and that to prevent this the United States will lead an international effort to “secure all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world within four years.” As a step toward this goal, he pledged to convene a summit on nuclear security in 2010 to “secure loose nuclear materials…and deter, detect, and disrupt attempts at nuclear terrorism.”

The global community, with US leadership, has been seriously addressing the challenges of securing vulnerable fissile materials since the winter of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, 17 years later, significant challenges not only persist but also continue to spread. Not all nuclear security objectives have been accomplished in Russia and the former Soviet states, and the danger is no longer confined to that region.

International cooperation on this agenda needs to significantly improve if there is to be any hope of meeting—or even approaching—Obama’s four-year goal. In particular, there needs to be a greater global consensus on the urgency of this agenda, more and continued financing for it by the world’s wealthiest nations, greater willingness to cooperate on the part of developed and developing nations, and a multilateral implementation plan.

Building a New Global Framework
An international summit on this issue, featuring heads of state, is an unprecedented opportunity to drive the agenda that must not be missed. The lead-up to the summit should be used to generate new international commitments to secure fissile materials worldwide, culminating in specific goals and actions approved at the summit. Galvanizing the international community to face a transnational danger is a unique challenge, in part because of the differing perspectives of countries on the problem and because of domestic political and economic interests. The goals of the summit are already being influenced by the domestic and political agendas of key countries. However, on the issues of nuclear security and nuclear terrorism, there needs to be an international consensus on the danger, despite differing opinions on the solutions.

It has been very difficult to establish the legitimacy of nuclear security activities that are not based on international treaties. Given the sensitivities surrounding the issue of fissile material possession, it is unlikely that any comprehensive new international agreement mandating specific security measures will be reached in the near future. However, the choice is not between a binding agreement and ad hoc activities. The requirement is for a fusion of the two resulting in the creation of a new framework agreement.

Building Consensus for a New Policy Agenda
There is no international framework agreement on fissile material security and, as a result, no organizing force to drive the agenda. Establishing global fissile material security as a top-level international objective will require consensus on new policy initiatives.

Creating a framework agreement that identifies the threats to mankind from vulnerable fissile materials, especially those posed by terrorists—and actions to mitigate them—is one important objective that merits consideration. A framework agreement would allow the subject to be acknowledged as a global priority at a very high political level and enable specific steps to be taken to ensure that it is achieved as an international imperative.

Below is a sampling of multilateral and domestic policy initiatives that are ripe for implementation and could be included in a new framework agreement. (A complete listing of policy recommendations can be found in the full policy analysis brief. See “Resources” below for information on accessing the full brief.)

• Create a global nuclear material security roadmap based on measurable benchmarks of vulnerability and proven security upgrades.


• Accelerate efforts to secure and eliminate global highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium stockpiles.


• Minimize and then eliminate the use of HEU, as HEU is the most useful and accessible fissile material for terrorists.


• Secure all radiological sources in hospitals around the world.


• Increase funding for the agenda overall—i.e., International Atomic Energy Agency safeguard activities, US-led efforts such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, and the expansion of the multilateral G-8 Global Partnership.

Within six months of taking office, President Obama committed the United States to one of the most essential and ambitious policies for protecting the globe from nuclear terrorism and has taken steps to implement it. He has made a commitment to secure all vulnerable nuclear material in four years, scheduled a heads-of-state level nuclear security summit for April 2010, and worked with the UN Security Council to achieve approval of a new resolution on nonproliferation issues. However, the administration’s actions to date have only been a necessary prelude to more aggressive and intensified international action. Now the hard work of hammering out new policies, generating sustainable funding streams, and implementing new security measures must begin. Securing all vulnerable nuclear material in four years is a necessary global security objective and the maximum effort must be made to achieve it, both in the United States and internationally.

Resources
This article is a summary of a policy analysis brief by Kenneth N. Luongo, president and founder of the Partnership for Global Security.

The Fissile Materials Working Group, a group of 23 NGO experts, has made a series of policy recommendations in a letter to President Obama. This working group believes in the administration’s four-year policy objective and will work to see that it is achieved in the US and internationally. More.