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Chinese and American scholars exchange views

Americans, even those who closely follow world affairs, are often unaware of the debate inside China over the country's growing power and international future. To bring greater attention and understanding to this debate, a group of Chinese and American scholars gathered last August for a two-day conference. Organized by Professor Deng Yong of the US Naval Academy and Stanley Foundation Program Officer Sherry Gray, the conference paired a group of China's younger generation policy analysts and scholars with their counterparts in the US.

The discussion was organized around essays written by the Chinese participants and written responses from the Americans. According to Gray, the purpose was "to get the Chinese [participants] to articulate their national interests and to highlight work of younger generation scholars and policy analysts." Nine position and response papers were written in advance of the conference. The papers addressed issues ranging from China's foreign and security policies to the nation's future role in the world.

China's Rise
"The rise of China is granted by nature.... First, Chinese regard their rise as regaining China's own international status, which was lost in the past, rather than obtaining something new.... Second, Chinese deem their rise as restoring fairness rather than gaining advantages over others. This concept makes Chinese take their national rise for granted. They never think about the question why China must be more advanced than other nations but frequently ask the question why China is not number one in the world."
"The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes,"
Yan Xuetong

"American views toward China are certainly complex, and indeed some in our political system advocate a hostile containment policy.... The prevailing policy, however, recognizes that "the US, and indeed the rest of the Asia-Pacific region, has a substantial interest in China's emergence as a stable, secure, open, prosperous, and peaceful country." That quote is from the Pentagon's 1998 East Asia Security Strategy Report."
Ted Osius,
responding to Yan Xuetong's paper

Great Nation/Poor Country
"...Chinese leaders and the public believe that China is a nation with dual identity. On the one hand, China is a great nation for its long unbroken history, its contribution to progress of civilization, its vast territory and population, and its significant geographic location. China's greatness is also rooted in its permanent membership in the UN's Security Council and its nuclear capability. On the other hand, both the Chinese elite and the ordinary people understand that China is basically still a poor country, and its level of economic development and technological prowess lag far behind [those] of the Western countries and some of its Asian neighbors."
"Four Contradictions Constraining China's Foreign Policy Behavior,"
Wu Xinbo

"As China enhances its comprehensive national power, the Chinese will come to view their country less as a poor nation and more as a great power and thus this dual-identity syndrome should diminish in importance as a factor constraining China's foreign policy behavior over time.... State sovereignty will similarly likely become less important as China's power grows, but only if there is a mutually acceptable settlement to the Taiwan problem and Beijing's confidence in its ability to secure territorial integrity is enhanced."
Bonnie S. Glaser,
responding to Wu Xinbo's paper

Securing China
"Chinese security goal and tasks...are defined to guarantee the integrity of national sovereignty and territory; the intactness of its political regime; the social stability; the resistance against internal or external revolts; and the safety of its economy. As sophisticated targets, China seeks the eternal survival of the nation's governing values and principles, a fair and rational international order...and normal and stable state-to-state relationships with the rest of the world. It maintains that the independent rights of a nation be respected and a political, economic, and cultural pluralism be reserved."
"The Chinese Security Strategy and Its Historical Evolution,"
Wu Baiyi

"Clearly the global security environment has changed.... Today, failed, failing, and rogue states and transnational actors are the focus of the world's security concerns. They are the main sources of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, drugs, international and domestic terrorism, transnational crime, ethnic and religious conflict, and other new security threats. A strong and engaged China could help the major powers address these new threats and the 'new world disorder'...."
Russ Howard,
responding to Wu Baiyi's paper

Responsible Power
"Whether China can become a responsible great power or not will depend on both internal factors and external factors.... The objective of China's foreign policy is to strive for a peaceful international environment.... The small nuclear arsenal of China is only for the purpose of self-defense. China has unilaterally committed itself to responsibilities not yet taken by other nuclear weapon states, including the declaration of a no-first-use policy, the commitment not to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states and in nuclear-weapon-free zones. China has not retained any military presence beyond its own territory."
"China: A Responsible Great Power,"
Xia Liping

"[Xia Liping's paper] clearly illustrates the classic ambivalence which has characterized China's self-view of the world for more than 150 years. On the one hand...the need for China to integrate itself into the international system as a means to achieve not only much needed development and democracy, but also so that China can assume its much sought position as a 'responsible great power.' This has been the broad hope of many Chinese reform-minded leaders dating back more than a century...."
Bates Gill,
responding to Xia Liping's paper

China Bashing?
"Too often one hears jeers from China-bashers as well as complaints from China's friends that China has been too slow to understand American domestic political strife on the China question and too clumsy in its response to cope with such strife.... The real irony is that whereas Chinese understanding of American domestic politics has never been better and its response to it has never been subtler and sophisticated, American criticisms of China have never been louder and more intense since Sino-American rapprochement in the early 1970s."
"Frustrations and Hopes: Chinese Perceptions of the Engagement Policy Debate in the US,"
Jia Qingguo

"[There is a] pattern of Chinese construing virtually every US request or demand as a deliberate or foolhardy threat to regime stability—pressure to curtain missile sales/use, nuclear assistance, arrests of dissidents and political organizers, protect[ion of] intellectual property, help get to the bottom of campaign financing episode...construed as assault on regime stability as well as an attempt to contain and restrain China."
Tom Fingar,
responding to Jia Qingguo's pape

"...We came away with a better understanding of the Chinese vision of world order, Chinese views on international relations, and Chinese perceptions of the United States.... The conference has enhanced all participants' understanding of China's struggle in trying to reconcile its aspiration for power and quest for prestige, to search for the pathway from the periphery in the world order.... We were introduced to and were profoundly encouraged by the multiple voices alternative to Beijing's official line...."
Post-conference comments,
Co-organizer Deng Yong

According to Gray, attendees were very enthusiastic about the conference topic, participants, and format. "They (participants) would like to meet again next year to do a follow-up meeting." She adds that many of the papers presented at the conference will be published in the Journal of Contemporary China (US) and in Pacific Studies (PRC).