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Conference report(s):
"Ballistic Missile Defense and Northeast Asian Security: Viewpoints From Washington, Beijing, and Tokyo"
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China faces possible leadership changes at its Communist Party conference in 2002. Japan's political system has been weakened by a decade of economic underperformance. Democracy in Taiwan has, in part, risen on the tide of nationalism and the desire for independence—a phenomenon that raises the temperature of relations between China and Taiwan. North Korea has started to emerge from decades of isolation, but its future course is still unclear.

These are some of the uncertainties of the political situation in Northeast Asia. Many observers see it as a dangerous area and worry about the possibility of high political tensions or even open hostilities, particularly across the Taiwan Strait or on the Korean peninsula.

What effect would the deployment of ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems—either in the region as theater missile defense (TMD) or in the United States as national missile defense (NMD)—have on the security situation in Northeast Asia? That question was examined in a series of conferences last fall. They were organized by the Stanley Foundation's Emerging From Conflict program in partnership with the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and the National Defense University.

The project consisted of three meetings. In the first, a group of American experts on the region and other experts on missile defense was assembled to examine the issues. Subsequently, a core group from the first meeting met successively with experts from China, and then from Japan.

Different Perceptions
Supporters of BMD deployment say it is a necessary response to the spread of missiles to more and more countries, particularly "states of concern" such as North Korea. In Northeast Asia, they argue, defensive systems complement deterrence in protecting vital US interests, including security guarantees for allies such as Japan and South Korea. It also fits with US interests in trying to help Taiwan defend itself.

Opponents of BMD say the systems could be politically destabilizing and potentially trigger an arms race with serious repercussions in the region and beyond. Their reasoning is that defensive systems will be countered with more offensive systems—including increased missile deployments—beginning a spiral that heightens military and political tensions.

A Few Conclusions
The conferences provided an opportunity to air out the issues in groups that seldom have the chance to meet. No attempt was made to reach hard agreements. However, there were several prominent and recurring themes.

First, missile defense systems with greater capabilities, quite naturally, raise more concerns for the Chinese than do less capable systems. However, the capabilities of individual systems were less important to the Chinese participants than were US reasons for deploying them. Despite being told that the systems are mainly needed because of a perceived North Korean threat, the Chinese suspect BMD is "aimed" at them with US designs on dominating China. As the project report says, "Washington views missile defense as a solution to a serious problem which limits US ability to maintain peace and stability around the world. Beijing views missile defenses as part of a US effort to guarantee its ability to act anywhere in the world with impunity."

Second, much attention has been given in the United States to Russian objections to NMD because of the effect deployment of a system would have on the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. However, Chinese objections to NMD may be as strong or stronger. The Chinese know that even a limited NMD will take away their nuclear deterrent. They suggest strongly that NMD will force them to expand and modernize their offensive missile capabilities. Many American experts suspect the Chinese plan to do that anyway. However, Chinese participants made it clear that there is more than one path to force modernization. Some paths are more destabilizing than others. Those might be chosen if China feels seriously threatened by NMD.

Third, Japan has not decided to develop or deploy any TMD systems. However, it is conducting joint research with the United States. The question of ultimately deploying a system is vigorously debated in Japanese government and citizen circles. Concerns include how new systems would impact Japan's testy relations with North Korea, how closely Japan should tie its defense to the United States, and the possible perception of Japan as a more aggressive regional actor.

Finally, the Taiwan issue remains the most intractable political conflict in the region. The deployment of any new weapon system (or, for that matter, the buildup of existing weaponry) must be analyzed for the effect it will have on that dispute. Chinese and Taiwanese officials eye each other warily. And US efforts to bolster Taiwan's defenses are among the most contentious issues in Sino-US relations.

A Bigger Dialogue?
Clearly, there are wide differences between the United States and China on BMD. However, several Chinese participants said the time might be ripe for a formal dialogue between the two countries, particularly focused on NMD and broad concepts of strategic stability. As the project report notes, "This comment...stands in stark contrast to much of the anti-BMD campaign orchestrated by Beijing and the stilted nature of official US-China dialogue on this issue."

If such a dialogue were to take place it would also be affected by the status of US-Russian negotiations on NMD and nuclear arms control. So, as if regional politics aren't complicated enough, they also have to be considered in a wider global context.