

Review and Vitalization of Peacebuilding

The Stanley Foundation

May 21-23, 2010

Tarrytown House Estate & Conference Center, Tarrytown, New York

Opening Remarks

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Welcome to the Stanley Foundation’s conference “Review and Vitalization of Peacebuilding.” For more than 50 years, we have organized and encouraged policy dialogue among officials and experts from around the world in order to explore and develop multilateral solutions to global concerns.

Last June, we convened the conference “Peacebuilding Following Conflict,” which sought to assess the status and progress of peacebuilding and lay a foundation for the then-upcoming five-year review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture. This review is now under way. Ireland, Mexico, and South Africa have been appointed as facilitators. Over the course of the last three months, they have led informal consultations with UN member states, countries on the Peacebuilding Commission’s (PBC) agenda, regional groups, and others to gather information and ideas on how best to help countries emerging from conflict make an irreversible transition from conflict to sustainable peace. In planning this conference, we have coordinated with the facilitators in order to focus this weekend’s discussion on important issues that need to be addressed as a part of the review, thus contributing to the review process and beyond.

The PBC was created in 2005, openly recognizing that today’s international challenges urgently demand integrated, multilateral, and coherent approaches to their resolution. Yet in spite of an increasingly interdependent world, strategic international coordination has too often proven elusive. The PBC was explicitly intended to deal with post-conflict complexity by means of a coordinated, coherent, and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding.

This new and largely experimental body was envisioned by the 2005 World Summit as a coordinating mechanism mandated to “bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery.” In subsequent resolutions, the UN Security Council and General Assembly jointly fashioned it as a uniquely modern and strategic instrument with a membership reflecting the political, economic, and social realities of peacebuilding.

Five years after its creation, the PBC is still in its early days. However, many of the issues already faced highlight the challenges it is likely to confront in the long term, making this an ideal time to take stock of PBC experience and consider ways to maximize its potential.

The UN secretary-general has contributed significantly to advancing the role of the United Nations in peacebuilding. His report *Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict*, issued in June 2009, offered advice on how to support national efforts to secure sustainable peace more rapidly and effectively. It set forth the challenges that post-conflict countries and the international community face in the immediate aftermath of conflict. It underscored the imperative of national ownership of the strategic plan for peacebuilding in each country. It identified recurring peacebuilding priorities, including five areas commonly needing post-conflict international assistance: ensuring basic safety and security, establishing political processes, providing basic services, supporting core

government functions, and revitalizing economic activity. It described efforts by the United Nations to overcome its systemic challenges and enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of its post-conflict response. It advanced an agenda for action to support a coherent and effective response. It offered some 27 initiatives and recommendations for consideration.

Discussions and consultations within the last year suggest that there is a high degree of consensus about the importance of the UN role in peacebuilding and what must still be done. There is a remarkable level of agreement on matters of policy and philosophy regarding peacebuilding. The need is to establish and pursue priorities for achieving effective peacebuilding and finding ways to overcome obstacles. The challenge is more the “how” than the “what.” Let me list some of the areas having significant support:

- Peacebuilding is an important, necessary, and urgent function to help countries emerging from conflict progress toward sustainable peace and development.
- Peacebuilding can and should become a core United Nations pillar. Effective peacebuilding work should be developed as a central UN function. Strong political leadership is needed to make this happen.
- Peacebuilding is not an isolated activity, but one that must be integrated early and coordinated effectively with other forms of conflict engagement such as peacemaking, peacekeeping, and long-term development.
- For each country, a single strategic plan for peacebuilding is essential. This plan must be country-focused and developed on the ground by an empowered country team working in full collaboration with national and local leadership and supported by headquarters offices of UN agencies and other international organizations. The plan must have country ownership. Building and strengthening national capacity must be central to it. Creating such a plan is most difficult, considering that a country emerging from conflict and its institutions are likely to be in disarray. The United Nations must therefore strengthen its capabilities for strategic peacebuilding planning.
- One significant peacebuilding challenge is to provide strong and empowered leadership of peacebuilding work—and to deliver it coherently. Efforts to enable the United Nations to “deliver as one” should receive renewed attention and effort.
- Effective peacebuilding requires flexibility and swift action. The time window for success is limited. This means that financial and human resources must be more readily available. Action is needed to expand and deepen international technical capacity rosters, close the funding gap, and coordinate resource availability from international and in-country sources.

In short, peacebuilding is most likely to be effective if there is one strategic plan with solid country ownership, one empowered leadership team, and sufficient coordinated resources focused on building country capacity.

But agreement on what should be done is only a part, and perhaps the lesser part, of the challenge. Our discussion agenda asks us to explore the best ways of achieving these objectives.

The secretary-general’s report of June 2009 keyed into many of the issues that are being confronted in the current review process: how to promote greater coherence and synergies within and outside

the UN system and enhance the PBC's relationship with its parent organs; how to mobilize resources, encourage aid effectiveness, and ensure mutual accountability between donor and program countries; and how to develop common assessment and planning processes among national and international actors in order to monitor progress in the implementation of national peacebuilding strategies.

The work of the PBC must be built on the principle of national ownership. How can this be achieved and sustained? Improvements on the ground—including tangible peace dividends attributable to the national government that underscore the legitimacy of the national peace process—are the purpose of the commission and the ultimate measure of its success.

Peacebuilding differs from state building and humanitarian relief because it seeks to rebuild societies torn apart by brutal and systemic violence. Beyond reinventing political processes and governance structures, peacebuilding involves a rebuilding of social structures—a mending of national, community, family, and individual ties. The healing aspect of peacebuilding emphasizes the importance of local expertise and adaptation to address the ramifications of political, economic, and social destruction.

Peacebuilding must be a part of strategic planning during all phases in a conflict cycle. Peacekeeping and peacebuilding should be organically related, leading to an integrated, concurrent approach to creating stability, both during and following conflict. Early integration of peacebuilding into peacekeeping operations and the vital role the PBC could have in this process were consistent themes in February's Security Council debate on peacekeeping transition and exit strategies. How can this integration be achieved?

Just as we must widen our peacebuilding timeline, we must also broaden our consideration of the regional context. Regional dynamics can either support or threaten national efforts at peace consolidation. The PBC's intergovernmental structure makes it uniquely qualified to engage with regional actors and expand partnerships for peace in a regional context.

The PBC was intended to be a leveraging body for peacebuilding within and beyond an overarching UN structure. Maximizing the commission's value-added role as a coordinating, mobilizing body requires cementing close and effective ties to its parent organs, as well as to other relevant bodies within and outside the UN system. What should these relationships look like in practice? How can they best be facilitated? How can the PBC earn a central space for peacebuilding in multilateral deliberations within and outside the United Nations?

Recognizing the centrality of national ownership for successful peacebuilding, how does the PBC manage its relationship, connect with, and add value in the field? An often-cited asset of the commission is its flexibility, yet how should it exercise this flexibility? Should it follow a single pattern of engagement with countries on its agenda, or should PBC engagement be variable and multi-tiered? What should determine a particular level and type of engagement? What should be the process for "graduation" of a country from the PBC agenda?

In relation to these questions, should the PBC expand its agenda beyond its current four countries? How can this be done? What are the PBC's capacity limitations, and what would be needed for agenda expansion? Are some countries reluctant to come under the PBC? If so, how can their concerns be assuaged?

Finally, a fundamental challenge for peacebuilding is how to reconcile a robust priority list with finite financial and human resources. The PBC must develop its ability to marshal an adequate flow of resources to support the implementation of national strategies and reinforce national government accountability to its own people, while meeting the concerns of donor countries for aid effectiveness. How can the PBC become a more strategic partner with international financial institutions (IFIs), regional organizations, and other international donor institutions and help fuse their strategies into an integrated whole that supports a nationally driven process?

The urgency that led to the creation of the PBC is the same that drives this comprehensive review. Unfortunately, the best predictor of an eruption of conflict still remains a prior state of conflict in that country. We need to learn from what has and has not worked in previous peacebuilding efforts. The PBC was established in full awareness of previous shortcomings and envisioned as a new instrument better equipped to meet the need for a coordinated, coherent, and integrated approach to peacebuilding in post-conflict situations. This review will set the trajectory for peacebuilding in the coming years.

The Stanley Foundation seeks a secure peace with freedom and justice, built on world citizenship and effective global governance. Successful post-conflict peacebuilding is certainly central to this effort.

In the course of the next two days, we hope to advance consideration of issues crucial to the PBC review and thus contribute to continuing development of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture.

The rapporteur, Farah Faisal Thaler, prepared this report following the conference. It contains her interpretation of the proceedings and is not merely a descriptive, chronological account. Participants neither reviewed nor approved the report. Therefore, it should not be assumed that every participant subscribes to all recommendations, observations, and conclusions.

Conference Report

The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and its related bodies—the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF)—were jointly established by the UN Security Council and General Assembly following broad recognition at the 2005 World Summit of the need to enhance the United Nations’ response to the challenges inherent to post-conflict peacebuilding. The new commission was developed to undertake three critical responsibilities: (1) convening all relevant actors, (2) marshaling resources, and (3) advising on and proposing integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding, and where appropriate, highlighting any gaps that threaten to undermine peace.

In accordance with the commission’s founding resolutions, the PBC and its partner institutions were mandated to undergo a comprehensive review after their first five years of operation. The review process began in early 2010, bringing together relevant stakeholders to assess the experiences of the PBC and propose a path forward for the commission. To help facilitate this process, the Stanley Foundation organized a three-day conference, convening approximately 30 participants in Tarrytown, New York, May 21–23, 2010. Participants included the appointed review facilitator team leaders and representatives (Ireland, Mexico, and South Africa), members of the diplomatic community in New York, officials from the United Nations and the World Bank, and civil society experts.

The workshop agenda was designed to promote dialogue on the PBC’s achievements and challenges, engagement between headquarters and the field, partnerships within the UN system, ability to marshal resources, prospects for expansion, and other questions remaining for the review process.

Peacebuilding Progress: Achievements and Challenges

Early discussion underscored significant achievements since the establishment of the PBC. Conference participants agreed that the commission and its related bodies—the PBSO and the PBF—have contributed to averting conflict relapse and furthering peace and security within the countries on its agenda: Sierra Leone, Burundi, Central African Republic, and Guinea Bissau. Despite encouraging results, however, the past few years have also revealed shortcomings in the institution’s architecture, as well as in the political commitments of member states in support of its mandate.

Achievements

The commission’s achievements to date are notable. One participant reminded the group that the very creation of the PBC was one of the successful reforms of the 2005 World Summit. Its creation was a recognition that the United Nations, including the UN Security Council, had not lived up to its promise to deliver international peace and security and to take action to prevent and remove “threats to the peace.”

Participants broadly agreed that the PBC has demonstrated success in its mandate to sustain international attention and to broaden engagement and financial support for its agenda countries.

Many noted that sustained focus on PBC agenda countries had helped to raise awareness of critical issues on the ground, including gender issues and the political tensions prior to elections. This attention has led to increased financial resource allocations for countries otherwise largely considered

“aid orphans.” To this end, the PBC was credited with tripling resources for Guinea Bissau, and has been cited by the World Bank as a key player in helping to ensure long-term stability and economic development for that country.

Participants pointed to the important role the PBC has played in keeping the spotlight on Sierra Leone and garnering political support for various in-country efforts, attributing much recent progress to PBC engagement. For instance, peacebuilding assistance for justice sector reform, including training programs for judges and magistrates, has helped to expedite hearings for backlogged cases. Peacebuilding support has also boosted military training, which has enabled Sierra Leone’s contribution to peacekeeping efforts in Sudan. Similarly, economic development, the establishment of human rights institutions, and the reform of local government administration have been made possible due to the ongoing support of the PBC.

Other participants commented on the meaningful impact the PBC has had on the ground in Burundi. In particular, one participant highlighted the PBC’s critical role in defusing escalating tensions between the national government and the International Monetary Fund, which was threatening to delay a country review. This delay would in effect have frozen aid disbursements to Burundi at a critical time of growing instability.

Challenges

Despite progress in the last five years, the PBC has yet to establish itself as the “central UN pillar” imagined at its founding. Participants agreed that the PBC has largely fallen short of expectations to maximize its political leverage; facilitate strategic coordination through an organic relationship with its parent organs and within the UN system; and produce attributable, value-added progress in the field.

Participants noted that, as a new organization, the PBC has found it difficult to carve out and secure its rightful place within the UN system. The organization also has yet to formulate a clear vision of its post-conflict priorities. According to some, it has taken the institution too long to determine the central priority areas that best ensure against a relapse into violence.

Several participants remarked that the PBC’s formulation of priorities is constrained by the weak analytical capacity of the PBSO. Analysis too often caters to a New York audience heavily focused on headquarters-based issues (i.e., the creation of integrated strategies) rather than on issues most relevant to on-the-ground realities. Participants voiced an interest in seeing the PBSO deliver more guidance on technical matters, particularly on seemingly intractable or overarching issues such as youth unemployment, good governance, and security sector reform.

The PBC has also not fully delivered on national ownership. Those around the table widely agreed that national ownership should be the centerpiece of the commission’s peacebuilding efforts, yet they suggested that it has not sufficiently materialized on the ground. Participants suggested that efforts to secure national ownership must extend beyond engagement with the national government and enable input from domestic civil society and the private sector.

Participants described a PBC fraught with organizational challenges that stem from suboptimal relationships both within and outside the UN system. Several observed that the PBC lacks an organic relationship with the UN Security Council and has been unable to forge a more effective link between peacebuilding and peacekeeping. Strains on this central relationship serve as a fundamental limitation of the commission’s potential contribution.

The reluctance of emerging post-conflict countries to come under the PBC agenda was identified as an additional challenge. Previous consultations in the review process had revealed some appetite among post-conflict countries to come under the PBC framework. However, countries considering partnership with the PBC remain a fraction of those emerging from conflict.

While much of this hesitation can be attributed to misunderstandings of the implications of coming under the PBC, such as fear of removal from the Security Council's agenda and assumptions that funding options would be restricted to PBF allocations, participants also cited the inability of many post-conflict countries to identify an obvious "value added" to PBC engagement. In that respect, the PBC has failed to differentiate itself from other UN agencies.

Participants suggested that the complexity of the peacebuilding process makes it difficult to determine direct causation between PBC initiatives and field-based progress. The PBC's achievements are largely inseparable from broader measures of peacebuilding progress, and therefore potentially underestimated. Linked to this observation, some claimed that the positive results referenced in Sierra Leone were less attributable to the PBC than to a variety of other actors and institutions.

Others noted that there are quantifiable measures that suggest unique progress in PBC agenda countries. For example, most countries on the PBC agenda have made significant progress according to certain rankings compiled by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development. Yet while these measures show a correlation between PBC engagement and ranking progress, they are unable to demonstrate direct causal links.

Whether or not PBC value added can be quantified, there was a sense that the commission must more clearly articulate what it can offer to agenda countries in order to be considered a relevant partner in the peacebuilding process. Ambiguity regarding the benefits of PBC engagement might otherwise encourage post-conflict countries to view the PBC as an additional layer of interference for little return.

Are Expectations Too High?

Given the numerous challenges that were discussed, conference participants sought to reassess the expectations and the objectives of the PBC in delivering integrated strategies for post-conflict reconstruction and rebuilding. Speakers harkened back to early demands for the new institution at the World Summit in 2005 and indicated that the expectations and the sense of urgency of that period remain. These expectations may be unrealistically high for a body designed to provide political support, advice, and resource mobilization rather than ground implementation. However, member states feel compelled to ensure that the PBC maximizes its contribution and does not underperform.

Several participants cautioned against premature conclusions of ineffectiveness and failure, expressing unease with expectations that the PBC should be immediately prepared for optimal performance. New intergovernmental structures require time for their influence to be felt.

Others cautioned the group against confusing the shortcomings of the PBC with those of the United Nations' broader peacebuilding agenda. The concept of peacebuilding, within and beyond the UN system, remains ill-defined. Actors outside the United Nations often have a different set of expectations for the commission that are not linked to its true mandate. Assumed shortcomings of the PBC thus frequently stem from a broader failure to define a common peacebuilding agenda that clearly distinguishes the PBC's role and effective contribution.

Some participants felt that the greatest obstacle to maximizing the PBC's potential was a lack of genuine political commitment on the part of member states and the UN secretary-general. Many noted that PBC members have not lived up to their commitment to the institution and cited the need for greater peacebuilding engagement on the part of the secretary-general, both with the wider UN membership and within the Secretariat. A central task for the secretary-general should be to foster an integrated approach to peacebuilding among UN system entities, such as the PBSO, the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the UN Development Programme, and the World Bank. Greater attention should be paid to intra-Secretariat dynamics and to bridging expertise and activities currently operating largely in isolation.

Participants hoped that the review process would reaffirm the potential value added of the PBC and position it more appropriately as a core pillar of the United Nations and its work. Many urged the peacebuilding community to capitalize on the momentum and political will stemming from the review process, beginning with sincere consideration of the recommendations of the review process's outcome report and followed by appropriate resolutions on behalf of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

Moving Forward

In an effort to offer concrete guidance on ways forward, participants sought to identify specific areas in which the PBC can make a distinct contribution. One speaker outlined three such areas: assisting post-conflict countries in setting peacebuilding priorities, encouraging regional integration, and promoting aid accountability between donor and recipient countries.

Others underscored the PBC's potential to help identify priorities for field implementation but cautioned that it is a *peacebuilding*, not a *statebuilding* commission, adding that the PBC should target a narrow set of strategic activities that stabilize the immediate post-conflict environment and recognize root causes of conflict.

There was a strong sense among those at the table that there should be a clear division of responsibility between New York and the field. At headquarters, the PBC should focus on coordination and marshaling political support and resources. It should not seek to drive strategy development best determined on the ground.

Focused on the comparative advantages of a New York-based institution, one participant proposed that the PBC encourage the development of a common language within the peacebuilding policy community to ensure consistency in discussions among various actors and stakeholders.

In another proposal, several participants suggested it might be useful to establish an annual session for the commission to condense discussions spanning the calendar year into a comprehensive single dialogue on all pertinent issues. Such a meeting could also showcase lessons learned in high-priority issue areas that create broad challenges across all agenda countries. While agreeing with the benefits of targeted, high-level attention at an annual event, others noted that regular meetings are crucial to keep abreast of developments in the field.

Some pointed to the potential value of annual progress reports designed to trace specific benchmarks identified by national strategies developed for each country. Referencing similar reports commissioned by the European Union, participants argued that such reports would be useful in evaluating national progress and the effectiveness of PBC engagement, and would encourage targeted approaches to defined strategies by providing an implicit timeframe for achieving benchmarks.

This proposal resonated well around the table, with participants arguing that such reports would prove beneficial to agenda countries and the donor community, both as a measure of progress and as a marketing tool to attract private investment as targets are met and stability increases. Building on these observations, some suggested that the reports be presented to the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly with specific recommendations to be adopted by the two organs.

Headquarters and the Field: Ensuring Optimal Feedback and Engagement

Comprehensive National Strategies

Participants strongly agreed that field results are the ultimate litmus test of peacebuilding effectiveness and emphasized the importance of a single comprehensive and coherent strategic plan determined by needs identified on the ground. There was broad consensus that the PBC should respect existing strategies and should not direct redundant, from-scratch strategy development based on prefabricated models. The role of the PBC should be to galvanize international support for existing country priorities and to focus its attention on core, bottleneck issues that fundamentally impede progress, such as youth unemployment. The role of the PBC is not to draft a framework, but to ensure that a plan exists and to provide a forum for support.

In the context of this discussion, participants underscored the fragility of the countries on the PBC agenda and reasserted the need for national ownership. In cases where a comprehensive strategy may not exist prior to PBC engagement, priorities must be set at the national level in partnership with all relevant stakeholders, including the government, civil society, and the private sector. Past attempts at PBC-initiated strategy development were noted as excessively reliant on national governments to the exclusion of other domestic stakeholders.

Country-Specific Mechanisms: Presence and Forms of Engagement

Participants voiced deep-seated concerns regarding the disconnect between PBC discussions at headquarters and the implementation of efforts on the ground. Many questioned the effectiveness of country-specific mechanisms (CSMs) so deeply rooted in a New York-centric process and expressed concern that the current arrangement encourages alienation from on-the-ground realities and efforts.

Being literally and figuratively removed from the field, the current headquarters-based composition of CSMs leads to identifiable pathologies that frustrate effective support for tangible, ground-responsive progress. First, headquarters initiatives rarely stem directly from issues emanating from the field, leading to demands that are not always logical from a field perspective. For this reason, such initiatives may be received with antagonism and resistance due to differences in priority setting. Second, the lack of regular interaction between CSMs, the agenda country government, and the UN country team leads to ill-aligned policy directives and heightens frustrations among field-level personnel unable to operate under opposing sets of instructions. Third, the lack of coherence within the broader UN system exacerbates duplication and can spread confusion on the ground.

While acknowledging these concerns, others noted that basing the CSMs in New York retains some advantages, particularly in mobilizing legitimacy and political leverage to channel international engagement toward concrete results. They also cited specific risks inherent in transferring CSM presence to the field. Some expressed concern that a process based entirely in the field could be swayed by in-country bilateral political postures that contradict multilateral interests. Others noted that additional structures in the field would further complicate the already complex task of field-based coordination.

Many around the table suggested that the problem should not be defined as one of weak institutional representation of the PBC on the ground, but rather one of tenuous linkages that fail to ensure regular and effective feedback between the field and headquarters. Thus, instead of shifting the entire process to the field, participants called for the PBC to strengthen links and create a mutually reinforcing relationship between New York processes and field-based country team leadership. The need was thus defined as a more effective means of engagement with the field to better determine what value added could be provided by New York-based mechanisms and structures.

With that in mind, participants imagined a feedback loop between headquarters and the field initiated by needs determined on the ground. First, problems, gaps, or challenges encountered in the field are communicated to the CSM, which then engages UN country team leadership and other field-level actors to ascertain the exact nature of the needs expressed. Headquarters-based CSMs then solicit the expertise and resources required to solve the problem, returning to the field with concrete tools and resources, both conceptual and tangible, to fill gaps as identified. Such an approach would maximize the benefits of New York's political gravitas, while ensuring that its initiatives respond to field-defined needs and challenges.

Participants suggested that this feedback process must not restrict itself to dialogue between UN bodies and national governments; it must also provide a bridge between the broad array of field-based and international stakeholders, including domestic and international civil society. In particular, the PBC should place greater focus on integrating the perspectives of domestic civil society into its broader engagement framework. Some participants, for example, saw potential to strengthen the knowledge base of CSMs by engaging local civil society actors and encouraging them to collect and disseminate credible, supplementary data. In cases where local civil society remains weak, participants encouraged the PBC to more actively foster an enabling environment conducive to civil society growth and engagement.

The Role of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General: Strengthening Ties with Field-Based Country Teams

Having cautioned against a transfer of CSMs from headquarters to the field, participants sought to identify concrete ways to create a more effective interface between headquarters initiatives and field-determined gaps and challenges. Many participants felt that enhancing linkages between New York and the field required strengthening ties between CSMs and the recognized heads of UN country teams on the ground, in most cases a special representative of the secretary-general (SRSG). The SRSG, or equivalent mission head, is empowered to convene all relevant actors from the development and donor communities in order to promote swift decision making that ensures that field-based priorities are met. Rather than designating additional actors on the ground to initiate field-CSM engagement on particular issues, participants called for more dynamic coordination between the SRSG and the country-specific configurations, as well as more explicit support on behalf of the CSM for the work of field-based leadership.

Currently, much interaction between SRSGs and CSMs depends on the particular personalities of individual SRSGs and CSM chairs. SRSGs should be encouraged to proactively and methodologically engage CSM chairs and members and raise awareness of specific needs, gaps, tensions, and other developments on the ground. Participants proposed increasing communication between the SRSG and New York by establishing more frequent video conferences, designing efficient reporting schemes, and designating a specific country mission focal point available for direct and immediate contact with headquarters.

Responding to the general enthusiasm for empowering the SRSG's role in the field, one speaker cautioned that the SRSG should not be the CSM's only channel for information sharing and field engagement. CSMs should also be in regular contact with field-based representatives of the PBSO and the Department of Political Affairs, as well as other UN and non-UN entities on the ground.

Chairmanship of CSMs: Individual Versus Country Assumption

Much discussion surrounded the nature of CSM chairmanship and the implications of individual or country-defined leadership for optimal engagement and field responsiveness. Participants considered whether chairmanship should continue to be vested in individual permanent representatives to the United Nations or whether it should be assigned to member states.

Several participants were sympathetic to the idea of member states assuming leadership of country-specific configurations. Assuming intragovernmental coherence, full member state assumption of CSM chairmanship would provide multiple points of engagement with agenda countries, perhaps encouraging a more efficient flow of information between a member state's field-based mission, its capital, and its permanent mission in New York. This arrangement could inspire greater investment in the peacebuilding process for PBC member governments, allow for constant field presence in the form of an in-country ambassador, and lighten the burden for permanent representatives in New York, who currently assume the role of chairman in addition to their other official duties.

Some hoped that a natural outcome of full country assumption of CSM chairmanship would be the creation of a genuine long-term partnership among the various sets of stakeholders. One speaker noted chronic problems associated with the current system resulting from turnover of CSM chairs and the lack of vested capital support to advance specific agendas.

While supportive of the general idea, one participant questioned the effectiveness of country assumption in cases where the agenda country of the PBC is not of particular strategic interest to the chairing member state. In such cases, the burden of chairmanship would likely fall once again to an individual permanent representative, who may not be personally equipped or motivated to drive the process without capital support.

Others opposed the idea of changing the current system of CSM leadership and noted significant advantages to establishing a capable leader in New York personally motivated and willing to assume the role of chair. Such individuals play a powerful advocacy role for the post-conflict country as a result of their individual authority and status as a permanent representative, as well as benefit from strong personal networks with other permanent representatives based at headquarters.

Some believed that chairmanship should continue to rest with permanent representatives, but that care should be given to select chairs whose governments maintain an embassy presence in the agenda country in question. Not only would this presence indicate a substantive interest of the member state in the agenda country, but it would ensure links with a field-based figure able to advise the New York-based permanent representative on root causes, risk factors, gaps, needs, abuses, and other relevant issues.

Several participants also supported the idea of developing in-country contact groups of field-based ambassadors from member states with a vested interest in a particular agenda country's peacebuilding efforts. Some believed that such a contact group would provide a useful, field-level complement to a headquarters-based CSM, poised to collect and provide firsthand information and

perspectives from the ground. Referring to a grouping established in Burundi, participants imagined whether such a model could be readily exported and formalized.

Others, however, cautioned against such an approach. Appointment of new actors on the ground would likely frustrate existing efforts to ensure coherence. Participants also noted the negative political implications stemming from the perception of a group of foreign ambassadors actively inserting themselves into a peacebuilding process that should be driven by the national government and local civil society.

In spite of these discussions, many participants thought that the challenges inherent to CSM leadership and its insufficient links to the field were secondary to a broader lack of genuine engagement and political commitment on behalf of the commission's general membership. It was noted that many member states had focused greater attention on attaining PBC membership than on their individual role in promoting post-conflict peacebuilding through the PBC framework. Participants indicated that it is the responsibility of the entire commission—not of the chair alone—to ensure that PBC and its CSMs function optimally.

The Role of the Organizational Committee

Given its links to the field, CSM engagement dominated discussions of the PBC's basic architecture. However, participants referred to the Organizational Committee (OC) as an institution seeking to define its own identity and function. Given the breadth of its coverage of all agenda countries, participants suggested its primary function should be to facilitate the work of the CSMs, establish an overarching link with IFIs and the UN system, and broaden normative support for peacebuilding through promotion of reports of the secretary-general and other analysis provided by PBSO.

Some participants suggested that, in addition to a broader mandate to provide in-depth discussion of best practices and lessons learned, the OC could adopt largely universal issue areas, such as youth unemployment and drug trafficking, for concerted attention, assessment, and prescriptive analysis. In the context of agenda expansion and multitiered engagement, participants imagined a broad oversight role for the OC, providing a platform for engagement with countries no longer in need of the more devoted attention of a CSM. Participants agreed that further discussion is required to fully define the role of the OC and maximize its contribution within a more effective PBC engagement framework.

Marshaling Resources

Participants widely agreed that resource mobilization remains a central challenge for the PBC. With the assets inherent to its membership, the PBC is strategically placed to leverage its influence and multiply resource flows in support of field-defined peacebuilding objectives. Yet its potential to marshal resources has proven difficult to fully realize.

The intangibility of general understandings of peacebuilding and the breadth of its agenda tend to discourage traditional funders that naturally gravitate toward specific projects with immediately measurable outcomes. Traditional mobilization methods reinforce this problem, as such donors are particularly reluctant to respond to ill-defined and unfocused global appeals in support of overarching, rather than specific, peacebuilding objectives.

To overcome this obstacle, one participant called for the PBC to enhance its understanding of on-the-ground challenges and to focus its own attention and resource appeals toward a limited number of issues critical to basic stability and relapse prevention.

One speaker noted that the international community is ready to supply funds for projects in which objectives are well-defined and results are deemed to be achievable. In this regard, they encouraged the PBC to develop an evidence-based approach to focus issues that demonstrates direct links between targeted activities and the consolidation of peace and security.

The PBC and IFI Resource Allocations

In connection with this discussion, several participants focused on the relationship between the PBC and IFIs, including how to strengthen links and strategically partner in resource allocation and targeting. Questions were raised regarding when and how the PBC could influence the decision-making process at IFIs, particularly the World Bank. There was general acknowledgement that PBC members need a better understanding of the IFI decision-making process, as well as IFI-generated analytical work and ground projects related to peacebuilding. One participant wondered whether the PBC directly receives information disseminated by the World Bank on peacebuilding or if it receives its quarterly reports, which might help clarify the bank's existing engagement in post-conflict countries.

Enhanced partnership with the bank in resource allocation was seen as presenting particular challenges and benefits. One speaker noted that, procedurally, engagement must take place prior to discussions at the bank's executive boards, as plans are rarely modified at the board level and are the result of prior negotiation. Bank operations were also described as highly decentralized, indicating that the PBC would need to develop a matching approach for effective engagement.

A greater hurdle, perhaps, was acknowledged to be the zero-sum nature of the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA) disbursements. One participant noted the ambivalence of World Bank state-fragility specialists toward peacebuilding and expressed hope that the upcoming *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development* and the IDA 16 replenishment process would increase focus and funding for post-conflict countries. Another, however, doubted a radical shift in resource allocations, as increasing funds for peacebuilding would divert them from other issue areas, such as the Millennium Development Goals. Any such shift would require quantifiable evidence that funding for specific peacebuilding activities lowers conflict onset and the risk of relapse.

Multidonor trust funds were cited as a more flexible source of bank funding for countries on the PBC's agenda. However, focus on such funds was qualified with the observation that most donors use them to target highly visible cases, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Once donations for these cases are exhausted, little money remains for PBC agenda countries.

In spite of these challenges, one participant reminded the group that the World Bank, by virtue of its Articles of Agreement, is highly limited in its scope for political engagement within its focus countries. Therefore, relevant political analysis provided by the PBC would constitute a crucial value added for enhanced links between the two institutions. While the PBC may not be able to redirect the bank's funding and focus in any fundamental way, enhanced engagement between the two institutions would likely leverage assets and increase the impact of both.

The challenges and opportunities of enhanced engagement with IFIs are mirrored in the potential to develop closer ties with regional development banks. Participants agreed that such ties must be better explored and challenges addressed in order to maximize overall resources and coordinate approaches to targeted peacebuilding objectives.

The PBC and the Private Sector

Many speakers cited a potential comparative advantage for the PBC to engage the international private sector on behalf of agenda countries and to foster private investment in post-conflict settings. They suggested that the commission would be well placed to partner with national governments in identifying potential investors, as well as to provide a broader forum to attract investment interest. Given the PBC's alignment with national and local governments and its reach within the international community, one speaker suggested that the commission could be instrumental in fostering public contracting, engaging extractive industry leaders, and addressing issues such as private property protection.

While several speakers thought active promotion of private investment would be a useful focus for the PBC, others were less enthusiastic. For instance, one observed that multinational corporations in a majority of sectors are reluctant to operate in post-conflict environments. Another was skeptical of the benefits of increased private investment in post-conflict settings, observing that the sudden bump in productivity that results from such investment quickly hits a ceiling defined by resource restrictions in post-conflict environments. They suggested that it would be more effective to foster immediate, sustainable growth in domestic markets, focusing on basic intracommunity service provision, as well as existing agricultural and manufacturing sectors. The PBC should also more directly support governments in efforts to harness resource management for immediate job creation and sustainable growth.

Some also cautioned against overemphasizing the comparative advantages of the PBC in supporting such endeavors. Other forums may, in fact, be better suited to mobilize private investment, such as local chambers of commerce and the Davos World Economic Forum.

The PBC and the PBF

The relationship between the PBC and PBF was a central question for many participants. Administered by the PBSO with final allocations determined by the UN secretary-general, PBF funds are not at the immediate disposal of the commission. As PBC attention becomes more strategically targeted, the inability to directly mobilize catalytic funds in line with its focus presents a difficult challenge for the PBC.

In light of this reality, participants explored the value of better aligning the two institutions to more effectively leverage their advantages and resources. While there was a widespread sense that better linkages are required, some voiced concern about allowing the PBC directive power over PBF allocations. The PBF was explicitly designed with an independent accountability mechanism intended to delink its decision-making process from the intergovernmental political process of the PBC. Fundamental strategic differences between the PBC and the PBF, as well as the fact that the PBF is funded by voluntary contributions, often require distinctly different deliverables from the two institutions.

Several participants suggested that the challenge facing the PBC and PBF is one of communication rather than institutional alignment. While close to 60 percent of PBF financing is currently directed toward countries on the PBC agenda, one participant noted that greater confidence in the commission's operations could shift more resources in its direction. Another suggested that the PBC should expand its funding focus within the UN system beyond the PBF, as other UN agencies—such as the Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the UN Environment Programme, and the UN Office for Project Services—control sources of emergency funding that could be tapped for immediate and catalytic peacebuilding objectives.

Stages of PBC Engagement:

Preventive Peacebuilding and the Peacebuilding/Peacekeeping Nexus

There was broad consensus around the table that the complexity of peacebuilding requires engagement in all conflict stages, including peacemaking, peacekeeping, and within the context of broader post-conflict development.

Preventive PBC Engagement

Some participants suggested that it may be time to consider a preventive role for the PBC, providing relevant expertise in periods of mounting tension prior to the outbreak of conflict. They noted that peacebuilding is a fundamentally preventive exercise, focused in post-conflict settings on relapse prevention.

While recognition of the nonsequential nature of conflict and obvious links between peacebuilding and conflict prevention encouraged many to support PBC engagement in pre-conflict prevention, participants raised many questions regarding scope and trigger mechanisms, as well as issues related to sovereignty.

The issue was thus identified as an area meriting additional thought and discussion in the course of the review process.

Integrating Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

The symbiotic relationship between peacekeeping and peacebuilding has long been acknowledged, with peacebuilding elements traced back to missions as early as Namibia (1989) and El Salvador (1991). The term *peace operations* was developed to reflect this multidimensional quality, while the UN secretary-general has frequently referred to peacekeepers as “early peacebuilders.” The Security Council has also emphasized the importance of this relationship, which was reflected in a presidential statement issued in February 2010.

However, translating this relationship into a coherent operational approach has proven a greater challenge than conceptual acceptance. Many questions remain, on the ground and at the institutional level. Participants noted the budgetary complications of simultaneous peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and cited imbalance and ambiguity in funding sources between the two activities. In general, peacebuilding funds are voluntary, while peacekeeping resources are assessed. This encourages an imbalance in both resources and focus, creating emphases that are budget- rather than strategy-driven. When there is an operational overlap between peacekeeping and peacebuilding—such as in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process—fundamental questions arise about how such activities are to be funded.

Many participants attributed these operational challenges to the fact that the United Nations still lacks a clear doctrine as to how to implement peacebuilding activities. Peacebuilding remains a shared mandate, not only within peace operations but also among a diverse spectrum of UN and external entities. The PBC was created in part to encourage cohesiveness of purpose and action among these actors, and could further its efforts in this area through a mapping of responsibilities among the various actors within the UN system.

The PBC and the Security Council: Fostering Effective Cooperation

The current suboptimal relationship between the PBC and the Security Council was widely identified as central to the challenge of fully integrating relevant approaches to peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

This relationship is crucial to the United Nations' peacebuilding efforts, not only because of the peacekeeping/peacebuilding nexus but also because the highly political nature of many elements of the peacebuilding process demands concerted Security Council engagement to ensure progress.

In the context of this discussion, one speaker suggested that Security Council members need to more effectively internalize the interdependence of security and peacebuilding challenges, which would underscore the potential contribution of the PBC to the Security Council's decision-making process.

Other recommendations centered on forms of dialogue between the two bodies. While viewed as symbolically important, participants insisted that inclusion of the PBC in the formal Security Council debate process was insufficient to maximize the value of potential input from one body to the other. They suggested informal forms of interaction, such as PBC inclusion in early, informal discussions on mandate strengthening and design.

Some participants, however, questioned the viability of such informal forums. These participants focused on existing formal mechanisms that could be more effectively mobilized, including Security Council Resolution 1323, which provides for the invitation of individual member states to give advice prior to council decisions. They also suggested more detailed examination of the processes for inviting Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Political Affairs staffers to the council, and consideration of opportunities to engage the PBSO through similar channels.

Others noted that the disconnect between the PBC and the Security Council is remarkable in light of the substantial membership overlap between the two bodies. Participants underscored that internal mission coherence and coordination between those that service the two bodies is fundamental to identifying areas of mutual concern and developing a more effective partnership.

Security Council Input and PBSO Capacities

Several participants indicated that the Security Council's reluctance to engage the PBSO in more regular consultation stems from the office's lack of concrete input and general analytical capacity. This deficiency creates a lack of credibility and a tendency to dismiss the sense of value added by PBSO engagement.

Many noted that the PBSO and the PBC more generally should be a source of expertise on core peacebuilding issue areas such as root causes of conflict, security sector reform, gender empowerment, basic economic development, and border partitions. However, the analysis and recommendations stemming from PBSO on these integral issues are, at best, patchy.

Acknowledging these deficiencies, participants widely agreed that current expectations thrust on the PBSO are largely unrealistic given the complexity of its mandate and its limited resources. The office was originally envisioned as a small and nimble support office that would at once serve as a secretariat for the PBC, manage the PBF, and maintain intra-Secretariat and interagency links in support of crosscutting peacebuilding activities. Because of severely limited staffing resources, the PBSO's expertise is not its own—a situation that limits not only its analytical output but also its credibility and institutional space within the Secretariat.

The concerns that prompted member states to found the PBSO as a “small peacebuilding support office” to be funded “within existing resources” remain. Participants thus agreed that the question of balancing expectations and resources called for further dialogue in the course of the review process.

Expanding the PBC Agenda

The feasibility of PBC agenda expansion beyond its four current focus countries was acknowledged as a central question for the review process. Several participants emphasized global post-conflict needs and indicated that the institution's relevance was linked to its capacity to add new and more complex cases to its agenda.

While recognizing the great need for peacebuilding work and the potential role for the PBC, other participants were more cautious regarding potential for scaling up the institution. They noted financial and human resource restrictions and suggested that programs cannot expand indefinitely without being ultimately bound by certain constraints.

Participants thus imagined the implications of a significant increase in the number of agenda countries. Within the PBC's intergovernmental structures, the CSMs would be strained by the limits of PBC membership, struggling to identify chairs for each configuration and splitting the attention of members among several agenda countries. Meeting loads would have to expand beyond current scheduling frameworks, which would challenge member state participation at the highest levels of representation.

Agenda expansion would also have serious staffing implications for the PBSO, which already suffers from inadequate personnel resources. Such constraints are relevant not only to an expansion in total numbers but also to consideration of more complex cases, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Participants agreed that significant adjustments would have to be made in order to meet expectations in such cases. The political potency of cases such as the DRC would only increase the demand for improved coordination between the PBC and other UN structures, most particularly the Security Council.

Participants agreed that care must be taken not to overwhelm the PBC's institutional machinery and sought to address these capacity concerns by promoting a multitiered approach to future PBC engagements and agenda expansion. There is little reason to assume that all potential agenda countries require the same level and form of engagement with the PBC. Joining the PBC agenda should involve a strategic evaluation of the PBC's role in a given case, a role that could be continuously re-evaluated and strategically adjusted based on needs and capacities relevant to its particular country context. Such an approach would likely manifest in a type of engagement participants termed "PBC-lite" or a level of political attention and support that would fall short of the full institutional arrangements implied in a devoted CSM.

Graduation

Several participants noted that a discussion of PBC expansion should occur in tandem with a dialogue on graduation. Perception of the PBC as an effective institution is tied to its ability to help states move beyond the need for its engagement. With a central purpose of enabling field progress, specified benchmarks and indicators should be part of a continuous evaluation process, with the ultimate goal of PBC disengagement from countries that have moved beyond the immediate challenges of post-conflict instability.

This premise encouraged a sense among participants that countries should not remain on the agenda indefinitely and that graduation indicators should be considered from the earliest stages of PBC engagement. Much discussion centered on whether and how to establish benchmarks for ultimate graduation from the PBC agenda. Many participants suggested that any adopted benchmarks should not be purely technical or quantitative and should include qualitative assessments of political, economic, and social realities. One speaker called participants' attention to the deceptiveness

of broad indicators that mask disparities and reflect progress that does not resonate with experience on the ground.

Participants discussed at length how to create appropriate benchmarks and widely agreed that they should stem from national strategies determined in the domestic, post-conflict context. Several participants pointed to existing national strategies, including those developed in partnership with international institutions (such as World Bank Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers) as an important guide for developing context-appropriate benchmarks.

While agreeing with the theoretical benefit of established benchmarks for agenda graduation, others cautioned against assuming their effectiveness. One participant cited previous benchmarking attempts made by the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, the US Agency for International Development, and the World Bank, all of which were abandoned when they proved too controversial.

Going beyond this caution, some participants insisted any immediate discussion on exit strategies was premature within a process as long term and complex as peacebuilding. One participant noted that all four countries currently on the PBC agenda remain on the UN Security Council agenda and that serious consideration of removal should not occur in the PBC context prior to such consideration by the Security Council. Another, however, cautioned against imagining a direct link between Security Council and PBC agendas, or automatic trigger mechanisms that would affect the status of a country on one agenda by a shift in its status on the other. The mandates of the two institutions, though mutually relevant, are distinct and should not prejudice either's engagement with particular post-conflict countries.

Some participants felt that agenda countries themselves should determine at what point PBC engagement is no longer required. Others argued for a multitiered phaseout process that would gradually and strategically lighten engagement with specific agenda countries. This process could manifest as an eventual movement away from country-specific configurations toward working groups that would monitor progress and provide regular reports to the OC. Those advocating such an approach noted that while traditional exit strategies may not be appropriate to the peacebuilding context, it would be worthwhile to consider ways of progressively decreasing PBC engagement as in-country conditions improve.

Questions Remaining for the Review Process

While discussion revealed widespread agreement on many issues, conference participants identified several key areas that continue to pose questions relevant to the review process. These issue areas include:

- Adapting the CSMs for greatest impact on the ground.
 - How should CSMs be structured to best respond to demands emerging from the field? Should CSMs have a ground presence or field-based platform for engagement? What would this look like?
 - Should CSM leadership remain vested in the chairmanship of an individual permanent representative? If not, should there be full country assumption of PBC chairmanship, represented by permanent representatives in New York with support from capitals and ground-based embassies?
 - Within CSMs, how much leadership should be shouldered by the chair, and how much should stem from active member engagement?

- What should be the role of the SRSGs and their links to the CSM?
- Progress benchmarks and exit strategies.
 - How can progress be measured in PBC countries? Should there be a process of ultimate disengagement from the PBC agenda?
 - Should countries decide for themselves when CSM engagement would no longer be necessary, or should specific benchmarks be considered for the eventual development of PBC exit strategies?
 - Would country-specific annual reports provide a useful basis for evaluation, incentive to maintain focus and demonstrate performance, and/or a time-bound framework in which to achieve field-generated goals?
- PBC and private sector engagement.
 - Could the PBC, and particularly CSMs, play a useful galvanizing role in engaging the private sector on behalf of agenda countries, or would such engagement be outside the scope of the PBC's comparative advantage as a political body?
 - What role can the PBC play in post-conflict economic revitalization?
- PBC/PBF relations.
 - How could PBF-distributed funds best support and maximize the value added of PBC engagement?
 - Should all PBF program countries have some form of follow-up or engagement with the PBC?
- Partnerships with IFIs and other financial institutions.
 - How can the PBC enhance aid effectiveness and relieve the monitoring and coordination burden borne by recipient countries in their struggle to implement a targeted national strategy?
 - What input can the PBC provide in the decision-making process of IFIs? When and how can the PBC best contribute to this process?
- Integrating gender perspectives into PBC engagement and analysis.
 - Has the imperative to integrate a gender perspective into the work of the PBC as specified in its founding resolutions affected its working methods or engagement with agenda countries?
 - How can the potential inherent in this mandate be better explored and mobilized?
- Regional approaches.
 - Are CSMs and the OC sufficiently addressing the wider regional context of agenda countries?
 - How can the CSMs more effectively partner with regional and subregional organizations in support of the peacebuilding process?

- The PBC and conflict prevention.
 - Is it time for the PBC to assume a preventive role in pre-conflict peacebuilding?
 - What would trigger the engagement of the PBC in a preventive capacity, and how would sovereignty concerns be addressed?
 - Could synergies be established with existing early warning mechanisms such as the African Peer Review Mechanism?
- Interaction between the Security Council and the PBC.
 - Can a bidirectional and mutually supportive relationship between the Security Council and the PBC be formalized? What would this relationship look like?
 - How can internal mission communication and coherence be enhanced in cases of membership overlap between the two bodies?
- PBSO and relationships within the Secretariat.
 - How can the PBSO become the small, strategic, expert-staffed body envisioned by the PBC's founding Security Council and General Assembly resolutions?
 - What would be required to secure its position within the UN system and grant it the authority to produce the analytical output and fulfill the fundamental coordinating role demanded by its mandate?
 - In the case of significant agenda expansion, should the original vision of the PBSO, as well as its current capacities, be reevaluated?

Much work remains to be done. The comprehensive review may not be able to answer all of the questions raised in this process, but the facilitators have expressed their commitment to study the central issues and complete their report in July 2010. General Assembly and Security Council action on the report will likely take place in the fall of 2010.

Chairman's Observations

This year's review of the PBC offers an opportunity to invigorate and vitalize not only the PBC but also the broader role of the United Nations in post-conflict peacebuilding. Peacebuilding can and should become a core UN pillar, a consensus explicitly reinforced in discussion at Tarrytown. The reflection and momentum inspired by the current review process will be helpful in affirming the centrality of peacebuilding to the work of the United Nations, and in securing the role of the PBC in its promotion.

Tarrytown participants quickly underscored field results as the litmus test of the United Nations' peacebuilding efforts. They supported the purposes and goals of peacebuilding. They also identified obstacles that seem inherent to complex undertakings that require both field operations and headquarters-support activities, particularly when multiple headquarters-based entities are involved. How can coherence, coordination, and strong support be achieved?

Placing primary focus in the field offers the greatest likelihood of success. If we "get it right" on the ground, it becomes far easier to align headquarters-based efforts in robust and coordinated support. Such a field focus will reinforce the United Nations' capacity to "deliver as one."

Getting it right in the field requires several key elements:

- **A unified, strategic peacebuilding plan.** This must be developed on the ground in close collaboration with country leadership, including representatives from government, civil society, and the private sector. When relevant, it must be developed concurrently and in coordination with peacekeeping mandates and operations. Country ownership will be a catalyst for headquarters ownership.
- **An empowered UN country leadership team, most often led by an effective SRSG.** This team must be delegated the authority to coordinate and direct all peacebuilding implementation. Its mission is coherent execution of the country's strategic peacebuilding plan.
- **Coordinated resource commitments, both human and financial.** The strategic peacebuilding plan will include numerous elements for implementation. Reliable resources must be marshaled for all elements, whether from internal or external sources. Those providing resources must do so with the understanding that they are providing support to one part of an integrated plan, not to an independent and isolated undertaking.
- **Field-based leadership for field operations.** All parties must avoid the temptation of trying to direct field operations from New York. Micromanagement from afar is an invitation to disaster. The role of headquarters, as well as its comparative advantage, is in advising, monitoring, supporting, and encouraging.

With this field focus, optimizing and advancing the role of the PBC and constructively engaging various headquarters-based actors (within and outside the UN system) is more straightforward. Tarrytown participants identified numerous aspects of the work of the PBC and its related entities, including the PBSO, the PBF, the CSMs and the OC, that merit deeper examination. The preceding report lists them for further consideration in the course of the PBC's comprehensive review.

The PBC is well positioned to assert leadership in the responsibility areas assigned to it by the General Assembly and the Security Council:

- **Convening all relevant actors and engaging them in support of peacebuilding.** Within the United Nations, the PBC is an interorgan and interagency body. Outside the United Nations, it can build linkages to civil society organizations interested in participating in and supporting peacebuilding work. This puts it in a position to instill a peacebuilding mindset across organizational boundaries, overcoming turf issues and “stovepipe” thinking.
- **Marshaling resources.** The unified strategic peacebuilding plan will identify work elements and resource requirements. With its diverse composition, the PBC and its members have access to a variety of resource providers and can encourage resource commitments that are consistent with and sufficient for plan execution.
- **Advising on and proposing integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding.** As peacebuilding experience accumulates, the “lessons learned” function within the PBC should be increasingly helpful to those charged with developing and carrying out country plans. Participants in the CSMs will likely bring their individual country experience and regional knowledge as well.
- **Highlighting any gaps that threaten to undermine peace.** The role of the CSMs includes monitoring country peacebuilding progress. This should facilitate the provision of constructive advice to the country team leadership, interaction with agency and department headquarters to foster support and alignment with plan implementation, and collaboration with resource providers to enhance the availability and flow of resources.

There is a pressing need to improve the international community’s capacity for peacebuilding. Too few countries emerging from conflict succeed in achieving sustainable peace. The rate of violent relapse is far too high. After five years, the current review of UN peacebuilding is a timely one. The review facilitators are capable and engaged. The United Nations and its members will serve us well if they invest themselves fully in the review process and commit to advancing its outcome.

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